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ABSTRACT 
Ascertaining which interest groups are considered relevant by policymakers presents 
an important challenge for political scientists. Existing approaches often focus on the 
submission of written evidence or the inclusion in expert committees. While these 
approaches capture the effort of groups, they do not directly indicate whether policy 
makers consider these groups as highly relevant political actors. In this paper we 
introduce a novel theoretical approach to address this important question, namely 
prominence. We argue that, in the legislative arena, prominence can be operationalized 
as groups being mentioned strategically – used as a resource – by elected officials as 
they debate policy matters. Furthermore, we apply a machine learning solution to 
reliable assess which groups are prominent among legislators. We illustrate this novel 
method relying on a dataset of mentions of 1300 national interest groups in 
parliamentary debates in Australia over a six-year period (2010-2016). 
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Introduction 
The interest group literature accepts as uncontroversial a claim that ‘being noticed 
by those in power is crucial for organized interests’ (De Bruycker and Beyers, 
2015: 453). Nevertheless, there has not been a great deal of direct analysis of 
whether groups are indeed recognized as a relevant resource by policy makers. 
Instead, work has tended to focus on explaining variations in the involvement of 
groups (e.g. writing submissions) or on privileged access of groups to policy 
making venues, such as invitations to sit on advisory bodies or to give oral 
testimony to legislative committees (e.g. Pedersen et al. 2015).  
This work has been productive and is highly relevant to understanding the 
role of groups in policy processes. However, it is different from the analysis of 
another form of policy engagement, namely group prominence among political 
elites. Prominence can be defined as the situation where “a group has pre-eminence 
for a particular constituency or viewpoint, and is therefore ‘taken-for-granted’ by 
a prescribed audience” (Halpin and Fraussen, 2017). In the context of this paper, 
we focus on prominence of interest groups among political elites in the 
parliamentary arena, and seek direct evidence that elected members of the 
legislature reference groups in political debates. Political elites are unlikely to 
reference interest groups in their discussions unless they carry some weight in the issue 
under discussion, and by serving as some kind of placeholder or signifier for an 
argument or issue perspective. Similar to strategic behaviour in the context of 
parliamentary votes, policymakers will think carefully about which groups they 
mention (see Butikofer and Hug, 2015).1  
For interest groups, being acknowledged by policy makers as a relevant actor, 
whose preferences should be taken into account, is a valuable asset. If a group is not 
considered a prominent or key player in a given policy issue, their views risk being 
overlooked or ignored completely. Whether mentioning a group conveys it is an enemy, 
an ally, a credible or reputable source of information, political elites presumably 
reference them because the mere mention of their name conveys something to other 
policymakers and to the public at large. Furthermore, being referred to by elites in 
                                                        
1 While we focus on the mentions of specific individual interest group organizations (that could be 
considered forms of direct prominence), the concept of prominence could also be applied to particular 
groupings within society, such as farmers, lawyers, environmentalists, and so on. A comparison with this 
form of prominence (which could be conceived as a more indirect form) goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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routine policy discussions can be valuable to groups in relation to demonstrating their 
value to internal stakeholders (i.e. members and boards) and signalling reputation to 
their peers (i.e. other interest groups). Yet, interest organisations face considerable 
difficulties in gaining prominence among political elites. Indeed, policy scholars have 
consistently highlighted how difficult it is to attract the attention of elites: the finite 
attention span of such individuals means that much will inevitably be ignored (Jones 
and Baumgartner, 2005; Jones and Thomas, 2012; Walgrave and Dejaeghere, 2016). 
As elites cannot mention every group, they must make clear choices as to what group 
– if any – to reference in their arguments and position taking. As will become evident, 
we are concerned with a non-trivial form of elite attention, what we consider group 
prominence, namely the selective referencing or ‘name dropping’ of groups by policy 
elites in the context of them advancing political arguments.  
Assessments of group prominence speak to classic debates in political 
science around the quality of plural democracies (see Lowery and Gray 1994, 
Lowery et al., 2015, Schattschneider, 1960, Schlozman et al., 2012, Truman, 1951, 
Walker, 1991). While not many interests go completely unorganised, it is certainly 
the case that few groups go on to become regular and valued participants in national 
politics (Grossman, 2012: 170). Understanding what shapes this apparent 
disjuncture between organization into politics and acknowledgement by political 
elites is highly relevant for assessments of the functioning of democratic systems. 
In that sense, our broad approach speaks to classic questions in political science about 
assessing group power. As Eising notes, “… interest group research faces greater 
challenges to capture the second and third dimension of power (i.e. agenda setting 
control, cultural, institutional and ideational biases) than the first dimension, namely 
the prevalence of actors in public policy decision making (on these power dimensions, 
see Lukes, 1974)” (2016:6). While by no means perfect, the value of a concept like 
prominence is that by its very nature it encapsulates – in the context of everyday 
‘natural’ speech – an evaluation of the overall relevance of groups to policymakers. 
That not everyone can be mentioned, that legislators are generally forced to be succinct, 
and that they are seeking to be as persuasive as possible, means that frequent 
acknowledgements reveal tacit judgements about relevance.  
This paper aims to make two contributions to the existing literature on the policy 
engagement of interest groups. First, rather than examining the role of groups in a 
particular policy process, we focus on the extent to which groups are “top of mind” of 
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legislators, and are acknowledged as relevant political actors. Second, we demonstrate 
how this concept can be operationalized by applying a novel methodology, namely a 
supervised machine learning approach, which enables us to examine large amounts of 
text and evaluate not only how often groups are mentioned but crucially in what way 
they are being talked about by policymakers. Specifically, we train an algorithm to 
parse out prominent mentions of groups from the corpus of simple group mentions by 
legislators. In this way, we provide a useful tool for political science research, which 
may also be applied to assess the prominence of different policy participants (e.g. firms 
or experts) in other political arenas (e.g. the bureaucracy or the media).  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first two sections we clarify the concept 
of prominence and outline how we operationalize it in the legislative arena. In the third 
section we explain how we measure prominence applying a supervised machine 
learning approach, and introduce our dataset which tracks over 7000 prominent 
mentions of over 1300 national interest groups in parliamentary debates in Australia 
over a six-year period (2010-16). In the analysis, we clarify the distribution of 
prominence across our population of interest groups, assess differences across group 
type, and compare our measure of prominence with two more traditional measures of 
interest group engagement, involvement and access. The conclusion addresses the key 
implications of our findings and suggests some avenues for future research. 
 
From group effort to elite acknowledgement: interest group prominence  
Ascertaining the relevance of different groups within a political system is a 
longstanding task of political scientists. Yet, this has become increasingly harder to 
assess as the advocacy landscape has become more densely populated. While it may at 
one point have been possible for students of interest groups to summarise the landscape 
by reference to a handful of notable groups, this is almost certainly no longer the case 
(for a more detailed discussion, see Berkhout et al., 2017). How then might this problem 
be addressed? 
At the aggregate group-system level, scholars have turned to useful proxies of 
policy engagement. The first, that we call involvement, refers to the choices by groups 
to take policy actions such as write submissions to consultations or give evidence to 
legislative hearings. Examples here include studies of written responses to 
administrative consultations or letters to parliament (e.g. Pedersen et al., 2015; Halpin 
2011). Interest group involvement can be distinguished from the well-established 
 5 
concept of access, which denotes interactions where groups directly meet with elected 
or unelected officials and exchange information, such as closed hearings or expert 
groups (Balla and Wright, 2001; Beyers, 2002; 2004; Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 
2015; Bouwen, 2002; 2004; Rasmussen and Gros, 2015). Access refers to a situation 
whereby “a group has entered a political arena (parliament, administration or media) 
passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (politicians, civil servants, or 
journalists)” (Binderkrantz et al., 2016: 2). As highlighted by Eising (2016), these 
approaches speak best to the first face of power. Moreover, this approach has tended to 
privilege a focus on differences in the degree of engagement in the policy process (e.g. 
varying degrees of involvement or access that groups enjoy), rather than in terms of 
differences in kind of engagement.  
Our focus in this paper concerns a third approach to assessing the policy 
engagement of interest groups and the relevance of a given group, namely prominence. 
As indicated in the introduction, questions as to how political elites allocate their 
attention are often examined in the context of public policy, yet rarely applied to the 
realm of interest group engagement in the legislative arena. We aim to engage in a 
similar discussion by shifting our focus from involvement or access to the varying 
prominence of these organizations in the eyes of policymakers. If elites simply cannot 
pay attention to all groups, then it surely matters which ones they repeatedly refer to as 
they argue their case and defend their political views and decisions. 
Prominence refers to the taken-for-grantedness a group enjoys, or the extent to 
which it is top-of-mind among a given audience (e.g. MPs, government officials or 
journalists). As we clarified elsewhere, since prominence relates to how other actors 
perceive a particular group, and thus indicates which groups are considered more 
relevant, it is fundamentally different from concepts like involvement and access, 
which always relate to the role of groups in policy processes (Halpin and Fraussen, 
2017).  
Importantly, we distinguish between prominence and visibility. Whereas the 
visibility of a group refers to any attention it receives from policymakers, prominence 
refers to attention from political elites that demonstrates the relevance of the group; it 
is a “recognition or favourable notice of a group by policymakers” (Halpin and 
Fraussen 2017). In other words, whereas the notion of visibility mostly captures the 
frequency of elite attention, prominence is sensitive to the context in which elites 
mention a particular interest group.  
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As we will clarify and illustrate below, these mentions can be positive or 
negative in nature, implying that in some cases reference to statements or research of 
groups is used to support certain policy positions, yet in other circumstances claims of 
groups can be used to challenge or criticize particular policy measures.  Here, party 
political dynamics are likely to play an important role. While beyond the scope of this 
paper, it seems likely to governing parties will mention groups to legitimize their course 
of action, while the opposition will look for statements of groups that provide 
ammunition to criticize government policy. Prominence includes the sum of all these 
mentions, whether they are negative or positive in sentiment; that a group matters 
sufficiently as to be worth spending speaking time criticising underlines its prominence. 
Where such referencing accumulates for a specific group, we can conclude that they 
are highly relevant players in the political system. 
In trying to assess the relevance of a set of groups in a given national system, 
we argue that prominence is an additional – and increasingly valuable – measure. 
Specifically, it provides a unique indicator as to how elite attention is parsed among 
groups and which groups are considered (more) prominent. Prominence can thus be 
considered a scarce resource. Just as scholars broadly accept that access is a ‘policy 
good’ that groups would like to have (Bouwen, 2002; Truman, 1951), we argue that 
groups also strive to gain and maintain political prominence.  
Does high prominence equal high influence? Similar to other forms of policy 
engagement such as involvement and access, prominence could be considered as a 
proxy for influence. Groups that are top-of-mind among legislators appear more likely 
to have their voices heard. At the same time, it is not unusual for groups to operate 
under the radar, and let politicians take credit for their policy work and expertise. 
Therefore, we think the relation between prominence and influence requires more 
systematic empirical assessment, taking into account the political context (such as 
mobilization of other groups and preferences of political parties) and issue-specific 
factors like salience and complexity.  
 
Operationalizing prominence: legislative debates 
The way political representatives discuss and debate issues in legislatures matters. As 
Bara et al. explain: “if democratic politics involves the giving and exchange of reasons 
in public discussion, then the study of how reasons are given becomes important” 
(2007, 578). Those concerned with the quality of political discussion have used political 
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speech to great effect in assessing the degree of policy deliberation (see Bächtiger, 
2013). Others have emphasized the framing and thematic content of debates on specific 
issues (Bara et al., 2007). Still others see the value of text in systematically assessing 
policy positions and ideology of legislators, or preferences of external stakeholders 
such as interest groups (e.g., Bunea and Ibenskas 2017, Diermeier et al. 2011; Klüver 
2009; Lowe et al., 2011). These diverse studies share the same conviction that utilizing 
political texts that are the natural by-product of political activity offers unique analytical 
insights, in particular to detect ideological positions, political interactions and the 
specific nature of political conflict (Monroe and Schrodt 2008, 353). 
In this paper we focus on the prominence groups have among members of 
parliament. An obvious viable proxy here might be the mentions of groups – by name 
– during parliamentary debates by legislators. As it turns out, legislators do mention 
groups in the course of speeches, motions and other forms of dialogue. Yet, as clarified 
in the theoretical section, what we are interested in are those occasions where a 
legislator actively uses the group as a resource in their policy speech, which we 
consider a crucial distinction between visibility (being mentioned) and prominence 
(being acknowledged as a relevant player). Measuring the use of groups as a resource 
in legislative speech is crucial to our claim that prominence provides a useful way to 
get at the tacit assessments of the relevance of groups, as viewed by political elites.  
When addressing parliament, legislators need to swiftly convey a clear message, 
and they use various props to do so. One such prop is to invoke the name of a group to 
support and illustrate their argument or to congratulate or affirm the importance of said 
group for policy making. To be frequently used in such a manner is surely a strong 
indicator that a group is well established in the political landscape. The following 
examples underline and clarify the salience of the concept of prominence. Speaking on 
“MATTERS OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE - Goods and Services Tax”, a Liberal Party 
Senator made the following statement:  
 
“It will stand up and deny it, but it is clear. That mob over there and their minions out 
there—the Business Council of Australia [BCA], ACCI [Australian Chamber of 
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Commerce and Industry], the business groups—all want a cut to company tax, and how 
do they want to pay it? They want it to be paid—.”2  
 
The BCA and ACCI serve as useful – and necessary – shorthand for the 
‘business lobby’ to which this Senator takes umbrage. The same referent groups were 
used as an endorsement of decisions made. In making a 2015 “Ministerial Statement” 
to the House of Representatives on road pricing the Minister of Territories, Local 
Government and Major Projects remarked:  
 
“A number of participants in that debate expressed their support, last week, for the 
direction the Turnbull government has signalled on this issue. Business Council of 
Australia Chief Executive Jennifer Westacott said that the Business Council welcomes 
the government's intention to pursue much-needed reform in areas essential for 
business competitiveness, such as road pricing”3.  
 
The Minister went on to mention endorsements from the Australian Automobile 
Association and the Infrastructure Partnerships Australia. Here, again, name-checking 
the BCA serves to buttress the Minister’s case that their measures have business 
support. As both examples illustrate, the sentiment of the speech context in which a 
group is mentioned can be positive and negative. Given that we expect policymakers to 
use the claims of interest groups a resource, we expect that this sentiment will vary with 
their objectives: specifically, whether they are trying to defend or criticize certain 
policy measures. Yet, from the perspective of groups, it is the sum of all these mentions 
that demonstrates they are considered relevant actors by political elites. 
The way in which the allocation of prominence works – and why it is valuable 
to groups – is made even clearer when one takes the counterfactual: why did the 
Minister or the Senator not mention other business organisations such as the Council 
of Small Business Australia or the Small Business Association of Australia, or some 
other related organization? The cut and thrust of parliamentary debate rarely allows a 
                                                        
2Transcript can be found at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansards/433
8c56a-c77a-4a12-a868-652df075a3e9/&sid=0188 
3Transcript can be found at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr/19a
0a2a6-673e-4aee-8a78-d39a4d56068c/&sid=0082 
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legislator to indulge in a laundry list. And if they do, the choice of such diffuse language 
is to blunt the impact. So in choosing the few groups that can be mentioned, presumably 
the Minister passed over such groups because they would not serve as an equally 
persuasive endorsement of the ministers’ views. As we will explain below, there are 
clear and discernible variations in the way policymakers mention groups, which enable 
us to parse out routine mentions from those that demonstrate a group’s prominence. 
Relatedly, groups may also be mentioned in the context of providing factual 
information to the debate. For instance, many groups issue reports or analysis that are 
picked up by legislators to help agenda set, propose new measures or to criticise 
existing positions. Take the example of a reference to the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council (AFGC) in a Second Reading Speech on the Protecting Children from Junk 
Food Advertising (Broadcasting Amendment) Bill 2010. Greens Senator Rachel 
Siewert commented:  
 
“The advertising industry introduced self-regulation—the Responsible Children’s 
Marketing Initiative—in January 2009. However, research including the Australian 
Food and Grocery Council report just this year—January 2011—found that one in five 
food advertisements in children’s programs were for high-fat, sugar and salt products. 
The self-regulation is clearly not working to effectively protect children”.  
 
Here the report by the AFGC has been used as a source of data and expert knowledge 
to respond to government proposals. Our straightforward point here is that groups are 
acknowledged in the discussions of legislators within Parliament. The approach we 
adopt to operationalizing prominence has parallels with work on media coverage of 
groups. Journalists and newspaper editors know what sources will be most credible with 
their readers (see Binderkrantz et al. 2016) – and hence seek them out to feature in their 
news reportage. Considering the interaction between social movements and media 
systems, Gamson and Wolfsfeld for instance argue that: “The media spotlight validates 
the fact that the movement is an important player. Receiving standing in the media is 
often a necessary condition before targets of influence will grant a movement 
recognition and deal with its claims and demands” (1993:116). We think a similar logic 
applies in the parliamentary arena.  
 
Measuring prominence: a supervised machine learning approach 
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In this section we outline the data and methods we use to apply this conceptualisation 
and operationalization of group prominence in the legislative arena. We pursue a text-
based analysis of the mentions of groups by members of parliament. There is a rich and 
expanding literature in political science that has capitalised on the increased availability 
of political texts online – especially formal records of legislative proceedings - and the 
tools of automated text coding and machine-learning (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013; 
Monroe and Schodt, 2009; Wilkerson and Casas 2017). A great deal of this work has 
focussed on the important question of detecting the (changing) policy preferences of 
legislators and parties (see for instance Lowe et al., 2011). If we consider previous 
research that has relied on analysis of text from parliamentary debates, a common 
approach is (automated) content analysis via the use of search queries (to look for 
(different types of) statements on particular issues (e.g. van der Pas et al. 2017, Bara et 
al 2007), or mentions of particular actors). Here we take a complementary yet 
distinctive perspective, namely the prominence of groups in the speech of legislators. 
Rather than relying on dictionary methods (e.g. sentiment analysis using positive and 
negative word lexicons), we pursue an innovative use of supervised machine learning 
to validate our theoretically derived operationalization of prominence.  
Supervised machine learning provides a methodological tool for text analysis 
that, when applied and validated properly, offers a powerful “labor saving device” 
(Wilkerson and Casas 2017, 6) that greatly reduces the resources required to analyse 
large collections of text (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 1). Here, human coders assign 
text to predetermined categories in order to create a training set. The algorithm ‘learns’ 
by finding patterns in the training data and estimating a function to describe the 
relationship between the input features (i.e. words occurring in documents) and target 
feature (i.e. human-coded categories). Crucially, the model is trained using k-fold cross 
validation in order to avoid over-fitting the data, thereby maximising performance on 
out-of-sample data (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 13-14). Finally, model 
performance is evaluated on a held-out test set, providing a benchmark of the out-of-
sample performance for the final cross-validated model by assessing predicted values 
(via the model) against observed values (the ‘ground truth’ human-coded data). 
While statistical methods focus primarily on theory testing and input variables, 
supervised machine learning approaches are mostly concerned with explaining outputs 
(e.g. whether a group is considered prominent or not); which “leads researchers to be 
more concerned with prediction accuracy and less concerned with explanation” 
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(Wilkerson and Casas 2017: 5). Compared to dictionary methods, supervised learning 
requires domain-specific and coherent definitions of the studied concept, and can be 
validated easier by assessing model performance statistics (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 
9). In this way, the concept of prominence set out in this paper is too complex to capture 
using dictionary-based methods, as the word lists in existing sentiment analysis 
methods (such as WordNet) are too broad for the particular domain under examination. 
In line with previous work, this emphasises the value that supervised machine learning 
brings to political science research: it provides the ability to capture domain-specific 
concepts into a predictive model, and more importantly provides performance statistics 
to determine the accuracy and validity of trained models.   
 
Data source 
For our research, we utilised the Australian Interest Group Dataset (see Fraussen and 
Halpin 2016). This data set draws on the Directory of Australian Associations (DoAA) 
as its foundation.4 The Directory has been published since 1978. Its stated aim is to 
comprehensively list Australian associations for those professionally engaged in public 
affairs (including journalists, public servants and political operatives). The data we 
report here focuses on the 2012 edition.5 The DoAA is not something we can work with 
immediately off the shelf. As its name indicates, it contains a range of organisational 
types, some of which do not resemble what scholars would conventionally term an 
interest group. Thus, we took great care in implementing a systematic code-scheme to 
get us from the directory as published to our estimate of the main population of interest, 
namely national interest groups. The full 2012 Directory included 4,102 individual 
entries. We removed all non-national organizations and those that are not interest 
groups (e.g. corporations, think tanks and sport or leisure groups). After excluding these 
types of organizations, our remaining sample includes 1,316 national interest groups. 
                                                        
4 We thank Erik Johnson for assisting us with access to the 2012 edition of the DoAA as part of his 
Comparative Associations Project.  
5 These kinds of sources are well used in other countries to good effect. Walker et al. for instance 
highlight that “in spite of the serious concerns we have addressed about the source’s comprehensiveness 
and potential biases, the (US) Encyclopedia of Associations is widely recognized as the most inclusive 
census of national nonprofit associations. As a result, it has been used widely by researchers of various 
segments as well as the entire national nonprofit organizational landscape, and much of what we know 
about that landscape depends on the source. We have compiled a list of more than 150 refereed journal 
articles that utilize information drawn from one or more editions of the source. And, in many of those 
research reports, those knowledgeable about their own small segments of the associational world the 
source attempts to chronicle provide testimonials about its utility and comprehensiveness of coverage” 
(2011, 1328-1329). 
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Considering our focus on the legislative arena, we measure prominence by 
searching for mentions of organizations in the Hansard of the Australian Parliament. 
Hansard is the official record of proceedings of the Australian Parliament (both upper 
and lower houses); in the US context it would be similar to the Congressional Record. 
This unobtrusive approach to data collection means that we capture the way groups are 
utilised as a resource in the normal routines of the legislative environment. We collected 
this data for the 43rd and 44th sessions of parliament (28/09/2010 to 27/06/2013, and 
12/11/2013 up to 05/05/2016).6 The Australian Parliament website does not currently 
provide data in a wholesale fashion, for example through an API7. As a result, we used 
a programmatic data mining approach to data collection that broadly involved three 
steps.  
Firstly, for each of the 1,316 interest groups we queried the Australian 
Parliamentary website to obtain search results for full name of each group, within the 
specified date range. Two queries were made for each interest group, one for the Senate 
database and another for the House of Representatives database. This is what we 
hereafter refer to as total group mentions. This is the kind of data that has been used in 
the past to measure the visibility of groups (Grossman, 2012). Secondly, we parsed the 
resulting HTML data to extract the relevant information from each search result, such 
as the text transcript, date, time, electorate, party affiliation of the speaker, and so forth. 
The third step involved cleaning, sorting and aggregating the data for analysis. 
Effectively, this means creating a data set whereby every row is a paragraph equivalent 
where one of our 1316 groups is mentioned. We discuss the steps in this process in 
more detail below. 
 
Detecting prominence 
Our initial focus was on collecting mentions of one of our 1316 groups. As indicated 
above, past work discussing prominence has used mentions as a measure (Grossman 
2012). A similar approach adopted by scholars in the measurement of ‘access’ in the 
                                                        
6 Accessible at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard. Two parameters in the Search 
function were selected, the date (from=28/09/2010; to=05/05/2016), and also the "Chamber/Committee" 
filter. The scraper does two search queries per group, once for House and once for Senate. The total raw 
mentions is the sum of the results for the two search queries. The list of groups, code for extracting this 
data and the machine learning approach is available at https://github.com/timothyjgraham/measuring-
prominence. Replication data and stata code for all tables and figures is available from the corresponding 
author. 
7 Application Programming Interface 
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media arena (Binderkrantz et al., 2016, see also Binderkrantz, 2005; Bernhagen, 2012). 
We argue that mentions alone might be a good method of measuring visibility of 
groups, but not all mentions amount to prominence. As outlined above, prominence is 
generated for a group when members of an audience, in our case politicians, 
consistently use groups as a political resource in their work. This presents us with a 
crucial empirical task; how to parse out mentions that constitute prominence from those 
that do not? To identify which mentions indeed imply political prominence, we apply 
a supervised machine learning approach. 
The first step was to train an algorithm which might then be applied to our entire 
corpus of paragraphs mentioning groups. We implemented a code scheme whereby 
mentions were coded as prominence when a group’s views were used by a legislator, 
or where a reference was made to a group as an important participant in the policy 
process by a legislator. In those instances where a legislator refers to multiple groups 
in one of these two scenarios, we only considered a mention of a group as prominence 
if fewer than 10 groups were mentioned. On the latter criterion, the rationale is that 
prominence relates to scarcity of attention. Where policymakers list more than 10 
groups they cannot be said to be singling out particular group. Indeed, the group is 
probably not being used as a “resource” if it is part of such a long list. Rather, the aim 
is simply to laundry list the sheer volume of opposition or support. All other mentions 
are considered not to be prominence.  
Two of the authors coded 100 randomly selected mentions according to a pre-
determined code scheme. This was implemented and discrepancies discussed in order 
to finalise the code scheme. A fresh set of 700 randomly selected mentions was selected 
and the authors coded these using the final code-scheme, with a substantial level of 
inter-coder reliability (85 % agreement, Cohen’s Kappa = 0.725, Krippendorff’s Alpha 
0.724). This corpus of mentions was then used to train a supervised machine learning 
text classifier, using the Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm implemented in the 
RTextTools package for the R programming language (Jurka et al., 2013). The rationale 
for using SVM and RTextTools was to maximise reproducibility of our approach and 
make it easier for future researchers to undertake the same or similar analysis. 
Broadly, the goal was to estimate a model that, based solely on the text, could 
correctly classify whether a given mention of an interest group constitutes ‘prominence’ 
(or not). Thus, we posed the automatic coding of data as a binary text classification 
problem, where the independent variable is the text paragraph(s) and the dependent 
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variable is the binary coding of ‘prominence’ and ‘non-prominence’. For this research 
we wanted to estimate a model that would perform well in terms of both precision (true 
positives / (true positives + false positives)) and recall (true positives / (true positives 
+ false negatives)). In other words, the trained model should not only accurately classify 
‘prominence’ mentions correctly, but also return most of the prominence mentions 
within the dataset. For example, a high precision and low recall score would mean that 
the model is accurate but only picks up a small fraction of the actual prominence 
mentions. In this way, we evaluated the model using the f-score metric, which is a 
weighted average of precision and recall. Our benchmark in this paper was to achieve 
an f-score of 0.8 or higher, which we regard as a reasonable minimum threshold for 
using the tool in practice.8   
A five-fold cross validation technique was used for model evaluation, in order 
to maximise the validity and generalizability of the model to unknown datasets (in this 
case parliamentary text without a ‘known’ or manually coded prominence category). 
The training data were randomly sampled into five equally sized partitions or folds.9. 
Five models were trained and validated, rotating the data sub-samples such that each 
fold was used exactly once as the validation data and the remaining four folds as the 
training data. Results from the five models were then averaged to provide a single 
estimation of model performance. As Table 1 shows, predictive performance on the 
target category (prominence) was quite good and reliably exceeded the 0.8 minimum 
benchmark set in this paper.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
After training and validating the model, we then applied it to automatically code 
the remaining paragraph equivalents in the dataset. Further cleaning was required 
before processing by the algorithm. All duplicate mentions were removed: a case where 
a group was mentioned multiple times (e.g. 3 times) in a single paragraph would result 
in a duplicate line of data for each mention. We also implemented a rule whereby 
paragraph equivalents of less than 15 words were removed from the data. This was on 
                                                        
8 Other model evaluation metrics such as AUC are often regarded as ‘acceptable’ if the score is 0.70 or 
higher, for example when deploying risk assessment tools for violent crime (see Rice et al., 2010) 
9 Although 10-fold cross validation is often used, given the relatively small size of the dataset we used 
5-fold cross validation. 
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the basis of the project team scrutinising samples of paragraph equivalents at multiple 
thresholds (e.g. 10, 15 and 30) and deciding that 15 or below provided insufficient 
context for valid coding of prominence. While we could have retained these paragraph 
equivalents for the machine learning algorithm to process, they would almost certainly 
be returned as non-prominent mentions. By removing them as part of the cleaning 
process we ensure that the efficiency of the algorithm is maximised. The research team 
verified the results by manually evaluating a random sample of 100 automatically coded 
mentions, which indicated that the model was operating at the expected level of 
performance.  
 
Applying machine learning to examine variation in prominence of interest groups 
during legislative debates 
A core aim of this paper is to establish a valid process to measure prominence through 
text-based mentions of groups during parliamentary debates. Yet, an equally important 
motivation for pursuing this path is in the potential it holds to scale up the study of 
prominence by applying this algorithm to large volumes of text. In this final section, to 
illustrate its empirical application, we report on a corpus of mentions of our 1316 
groups across the 43rd and 44th Australian parliaments.  
As discussed above, scholars concerned with assessing the attention groups gain 
from legislators have relied on straightforward mention counts (Grossman, 2012). As 
such, in our present context, the ‘raw’ group mentions data – which is the result one 
would get by simply entering the name of each of our groups in the Australian 
Parliament website search engine – is a useful comparator with our machine-learning 
approach. 
Our initial search request of the parliamentary web search engine yielded 10,286 
mentions for 627 of our 1316 groups. Of our complete set, 689 groups were thus never 
mentioned in parliament. The mean number of mentions was 7.8, with a minimum of 0 
and maximum of 347. The results from our automated coding of prominence identified 
7287 prominent mentions. The mean number of prominence mentions was 5.5, with a 
maximum of 297 and minimum of 0. There is a strong positive correlation between 
these two measures (.97). This is in line with our expectations, as the raw mentions 
provided the input for detecting prominent mentions. Yet, we see that in aggregate just 
over 70 per cent of all mentions are prominent mentions, where groups are deployed as 
a resource in legislative speech.  
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While this headline relationship is of interest, what is just as relevant is the 
extent to which groups vary in respect of the percentage of all mentions that are in fact 
prominent mentions. We have 168 groups with a prominence rate of 100 %, which 
implies that all their mentions are prominent. We also observe 102 groups for which 
none of their mentions are prominent. Those groups for which none of their mentions 
were prominent mentions, or that have 100% of their mentions as prominent, both 
tended to have rather small number of overall mentions, ranging from 1-10 mentions 
and 1-26 respectively. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 reports the % of mentions by % of groups. It demonstrates the very 
skewed and concentrated nature of prominence. In our data set, 2.4 per cent of groups 
account for over 50 per cent of all the prominent mentions. That is, just 20 groups 
account for half of all prominent mentions. Moreover, the top 10 groups account for 
just over one quarter of all prominent mentions. Similar data is represented graphically 
in Figure 1, which shows that the distribution of prominent mentions is highly skewed 
(to aid interpretation all 0 values are removed from the graph). This indicates that the 
set of groups that members of parliament frequently refer to is rather small and limited 
to a small pool of ‘top tier’ groups. The highly skewed nature of prominence, with a 
small core and a much larger periphery, resembles a pattern that is also found in studies 
that focused on lobbying activity and other forms of group policy engagement (e.g. 
Heinz et al. 1993; Lapira et al. 2014). A recurring finding is that a minority of groups 
accounts for the majority of activity, whether it concerns forms of access such as the 
provision of legislative evidence (e.g. Pedersen et al. 2015), representation in advisory 
councils (e.g. Fraussen et al. 2015), or policy involvement, e.g. in the form of public 
consultations (Halpin et al. 2012; Yackee and Yackee 2006).  
 
 [Figure 1 here] 
 
Table 3 reports the top 10 groups in terms of volume of total mentions and 
prominent mentions. We can see a mix of group types, with all attaining more than 100 
prominent mentions over our time period. While several of these groups are most of the 
time mentioned in a prominent way (with generally more than 85 % of their mentions 
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relating to some form of acknowledgement), this does not apply to all groups (see for 
instance the Australian Workers’ Union and United Voice, two unions which are only 
referred to in a prominent way about half of the time). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
We can also see some variation in prominence when we parse our aggregate 
data by group type. In Table 4, we report the frequency and per cent composition of the 
Australian group population, compared to those with prominent mentions. Compared 
to their share in the population, both unions and institutional groups receive a high 
proportion of prominent mentions. Professional and service groups have relatively low 
levels of average prominence – in the case of professional groups, they compose 29 per 
cent of the population but just 15 per cent of prominent mentions. For business groups 
and citizen groups, the percentage of prominent mentions approximates the proportion 
they represent in the broader interest group population.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Overall, the distribution of prominent mentions is not that dissimilar from the 
proportion of group types in the broader population. Another important question 
involves whether there is a partisan dimension to this: Are certain group types more 
prominent among particular political parties? Classic work in political science 
emphasised the shared role of parties and interest groups as organised channels for the 
representation of social and economic interests (e.g.  Schattschneider 1948; V.O. Key 
1942) and highlighted that the latter often served as formal subsidiary organisations of 
parties (Duverger 1954). Whereas for many decades the literature on parties and interest 
groups has mostly progressed in parallel (Heaney 2010; Fraussen and Halpin 2018), 
this is changing somewhat recently (e.g. Allern and Bale 2012; Bawn et al. 2012). 
Recent work on the European Union level has examined the ‘alignment’ in the policy 
positions of EU parties and types of organised interest (e.g. Beyers et al. 2015), while 
others have focused on the interaction between groups and parties in several European 
countries (e.g. Rasmussen and Lindeboom 2013).  
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While groups themselves generally find public partisan support unwise – instead opting 
for broad bi-partisanship (Binderkrantz 2015; Halpin 2015), there is still good reason 
to posit that political elites will tend to choose sources from among ‘their’ groups. 
Following that view, one would expect a broad ‘alignment’ between conservative 
parties – or parties of the political right – and business and professional interests, 
whereas a similar linkage seems likely between progressive parties – or parties of the 
political left – and unions and citizen groups. 
 
Our data allows us to parse each prominent mention by the party affiliation of the 
member of parliament speaking. We have coded each mention by each of the three main 
parties – Australian Labor Party (ALP), Nationals and Liberals (Coalition) and the 
Australian Greens (Greens) – with a residual ‘Other’ category for minor parties and 
independents. 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 reports the prominent mentions by party again utilising our group typology, 
and highlights relevant differences across parties. If we focus on the three largest 
parties, we can observe that members of the Coalition refer to business groups 48 per 
cent of the time they refer to any group, whereas the Greens are most likely to mention 
citizen groups (28 %). Along with the ALP, the Greens also frequently refer to service 
and hybrid groups. Furthermore, the highest proportion of union mentions are being 
made by the ALP and the Greens members, while professional groups have a 
remarkably similar percentage for each party. These findings – pointing to party 
variations in the prominence of groups – suggest that our approach provides some 
important insights to scholars of legislative studies and group-party relations. 
 
Prominence, access and involvement 
But how does our measure of prominence compare to a measure like access, which is 
arguably the prevailing proxy measure of group engagement? Consistent with the 
convention in the field, we utilize invitations to give oral evidence to Australian 
parliamentary committees as an arena-specific measure of access (Pedersen et al., 2015; 
Binderkrantz and Pedersen 2016). When we examine a straightforward bivariate 
correlation between our measure of access and prominence, we find the modest positive 
correlation of 0.59.  
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Take the Minerals Council of Australia. It is often referred to in the mainstream 
political press as one of the most influential groups in national politics.10  Yet, on 
conventional activity and access measures, it barely registers. Indeed, it has provided a 
written submission to senate committees on five occasions over the period we cover, 
and has given oral evidence twice to senate committees – the key mechanism for 
meaningful formal input into the legislative process. However, it received 106 
prominent mentions – the eleventh most mentioned group in parliament.11  
This is also borne out in Table 6, which reports the top 10 groups in terms of 
the volume of oral and written evidence to parliament over the same period (group who 
are also among the 10 most prominent groups are included are included in bold).  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The data we present here provides empirical support for the conceptual 
distinctions made elsewhere between access and prominence (Halpin and Fraussen, 
2017). In aggregate terms, the two measures of our concepts are only moderately 
positively correlated. Yet, as would be expected, we see in some individual cases that 
particular groups are granted high levels of access (or involvement), and also mentioned 
prominently by legislators. Still, we see some cases where this is not the case. For 
instance, we notice that some interest groups focused on health issues (like Palliative 
Care Australia and the Australian Nursing Federation) enjoy relatively high levels of 
access, but nevertheless are not among our top 10 of most prominent groups. 
Furthermore, even though the Business Council of Australia and Universities Australia 
are two of the most prominent groups in parliamentary debates, they are not among the 
groups with the highest levels of involvement or access. 
Summarizing the reported findings, our analysis of prominence of Australian 
interest groups among Members of Parliament confirms that it is highly concentrated. 
Put another way, for the majority of groups, being strategically included by Members 
of Parliament within their legislative speech will not happen. We can conclude from 
                                                        
10  See for instance http://www.smh.com.au/business/lobby-groups-pull-strings-in-halls-of-power-
20130816-2s26d.html#ixzz3yPw71p9K 
11 Being prominent may be less important for ‘members’ of interest groups, especially in the case of 
business associations. Individual companies may not wish to be acknowledged publically as key players 
in a policy issue, but would be insisting that business associations that they are members of are viewed 
in such a way by policy makers.   
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this observation that while many groups exist to have their positions, issues and 
constituencies viewed as central to political debate by politicians, only a small number 
of groups are regularly acknowledged as key players.  
 
Conclusion 
Ascertaining which interest groups are considered relevant by policymakers 
presents an important challenge for political scientists. The increasing density of 
lobbying communities in advanced political systems means that groups will find simply 
being noticed ever more difficult. Moreover, as the attainment of particularly 
involvement, yet also occasional access to formal policy making processes, becomes 
easier, we can expect that being prominent will be an increasingly important asset for 
groups to possess. Our study contributes to resolving this challenge in two ways. Firstly, 
we have presented a concept – prominence – that speaks to the imperative for groups 
to be noticed in a meaningful way by political elites. Secondly, we have developed a 
method for measuring prominence that takes the linguistic context of parliamentary 
debates seriously. Moreover, we have developed an approach which enables 
measurement to be scaled-up to assessments of prominence across entire interest group 
systems, as well as over time, or at the international level (e.g. Dellmuth and Tallberg, 
2017). One could also use this method to assess the prominence of interest groups (or 
other actors such as think tanks) in a more specific legislative context, such as 
committees or parliamentary questions (Bailer 2011; Pedersen et al. 2015).  
Our findings show that there is substantial variation in the prominence afforded 
to groups by Members of the Australian Parliament. In fact, we see that many groups 
simply do not gain any prominence among elites. The pattern of prominence is highly 
skewed. This latter observation is consistent with studies more broadly focussed on the 
way institutions and elites allocate attention. Crucially, we show that our measure of 
prominence is not highly correlated with other concepts with which we have made 
conceptual distinctions, specifically access to policymakers.   
Our aggregate approach here provides a complementary approach to the issue based 
analysis of influence and preference attainment (see Baumgartner et al 2009; Beyers et 
al., 2014). We suggest that groups approach their specific advocacy task with the deck 
already stacked in favour of some over others. We can also draw useful analogies 
with the studies of groups and the media. In his work on citizen groups in US 
national politics, Jeff Berry asks “Who Counts?” One approach to answering this 
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question is to refer to mentions in the national political media. His rationale for so 
doing is straightforward: “The assumption is that beat reporters for these 
publications [referring to New York Times and such like] have some sophisticated 
understanding of the issues – or at least the politics surrounding the issue – and that 
their stories reflect reasonable conclusions about which groups deserve mention in 
their stories”. Noting that often times, when one aggregates all stories in a similar 
policy field, just a handful of groups are repeatedly mentioned, he remarks “Such 
judgements are taken to be a relatively accurate reflection of who are the most 
important spokesmen [sic] for the interests involved” (Berry, 1999: 23; see also 
Tresch, 2009). Thus, Berry intimates, inferences can be made from the pattern of 
media mentions in respect of which groups matter. Just as newspaper journalists 
and editors in effect use professional norms and insider judgement to weed out all 
but the most relevant groups to reporting on given policy issues, we have strong 
reasons to surmise that similar strategic processes occur for elected officials when 
they decide who to reference in their legislative speech.  
Like all studies, ours comes with limitations. At this point we have focussed on 
measuring the outcome – namely group prominence among legislators – but have not 
offered an account of the micro-foundations that contribute to this aggregate outcome. 
Precisely this point has been observed with respect to the advancing the literature on 
policy processing and agenda-setting within political institutions (Jones, 2003; Jones 
and Thomas,2014). One approach to this is to probe the way individual political elites 
– who in aggregate constitute key political institutions, such as legislatures – 
themselves allocate attention (see examples in Kingdon, 1984; Walgrave and 
Dejaeghere, 2016). This is an obvious way to extend the work we present here.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1. SVM Model performance using 5-fold cross validation 
K-fold model Precision Recall F-Score 
#1 0.87 0.85 0.86 
#2 0.82 0.96 0.88 
#3 0.68 0.90 0.77 
#4 0.82 0.85 0.83 
#5 0.76 0.93 0.84 
Mean score 0.79 0.90 0.84 
 
Table 2. Distribution of prominent mentions across groups 
% of groups n % of prominent mentions 
1 13 32.50 
5 66 66.04 
10 132 81.30 
20 264 93.45 
100 1316 100.00 
 
Table 3. Top10 Most Prominent Groups 
Rank  Name Type Mentions Prominence 
1 Business Council of Australia Business 332 297 
2 Australian Industry Group Business 347 294 
3 National Farmers' Federation Business 273 236 
4 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Business 262 233 
5 Universities Australia Institutional 247 231 
6 Law Council of Australia Professional 210 180 
7 Australian Medical Association Professional 196 173 
8 Australian Workers' Union Union 273 138 
9 United Voice Union 225 130 
10 The Financial Services Council Professional 139 126 
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Table 4. How do prominent mentioned groups compare to broader population?  
Type 
Population 
(No. Groups) 
Prominence 
(No. Groups.) 
Prominence 
(Mentions) 
 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Citizen 210 16 114 22 1265 17 
Business  480 37 192 37 3033 42 
Union 26 2 21 4 841 12 
Professional 385 29 105 20 1121 15 
Institutional 25 2 19 4 480 7 
Service  133 10 41 8 274 4 
Hybrid  57 4 28 5 273 4 
Total 1316 100 520 100 7287 100 
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Table 5. Prominent Mentions by Party, Group Type  
  ALP Coalition Greens Other All Parties 
Citizen  19 14 28 16 17 
 (570) (396) (183) (116) (1,265) 
Business  36 48 28 51 42 
 (1,066) (1,411) (181) (375) (3,033) 
Union 13 10 14 13 11 
 (380) (279) (88) (94) (841) 
Professional 17 16 16 9 15 
 (494) (455) (106) (66) (1,121) 
Institutional 6 8 3 5 7 
 (179) (245) (22) (34) (480) 
Service 5 2 5 5 4 
 (146) (63) (29) (36) (274) 
Hybrid 5 3 6 3 4 
 (140) (78) (36) (19) (273) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 (2,975) (2,927) (645) (740) (7,287) 
Note: Column percentages, counts in brackets 
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Table 6. Top 10 groups by access and involvement. 
Top 10 Groups by Oral Evidence (access)* 
    
Rank Name Type Oral Written Mentions Prominence 
1 Australian Industry Group Business 12 15 347 294 
2 National Farmers' Federation Business 10 21 273 236 
3 Law Council of Australia Professional 10 26 210 180 
4 Australian Council of Trade Unions Union 9 18 112 78 
5 Community and Public Sector Union Union 9 17 43 21 
6 Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
Business 8 11 262 233 
7 Australian Nursing Federation Union 8 11 23 11 
8 Australian Medical Association Professional 8 20 196 173 
9 Palliative Care Australia Citizen 7 8 29 26 
10 Australian Manufacturing 
Workers' Union 
Union 7 17 79 48 
Note: Several groups had a value of 7 for Oral. 
Top 10 Groups by Written Evidence (involvement) 
    
Rank Name Type Oral Written Mentions Prominence 
1 Law Council of Australia Professional 10 26 210 180 
2 National Farmers' Federation Business 10 21 273 236 
3 Australian Medical Association Professional 8 20 196 173 
4 Australian Council of Trade Unions Union 9 18 112 78 
5 Community and Public Sector Union Union 9 17 43 21 
6 Australian Manufacturing 
Workers' Union 
Union 7 17 79 48 
7 Australian Industry Group Business 12 15 347 294 
8 Australian Psychological Society Professional 6 13 17 12 
9 Uniting Care Australia Hybrid 4 12 5 4 
10 United Voice Union 6 11 225 130 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Prominence (n=520) 
 
 
